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Utah Code Ann. § 78-2A-3 (2)(h) (1988) 
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JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this Appeal pursuant to 
Utah Code 'uu > i i' i i M M II I . 
ii 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in awarding 
custody of the parties7 child to the appellee. 
2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in 
establishing appellant's visitation schedule and by denying 
overnight visitation. 
3. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by ordering 
the appellant to pay $1,500, which was half of the cost of 
the custody evaluation, to the appellee. 
4. Whether the trial court committed error in refusing to award 
the appellant claimed day-care costs. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Utah Code of Judicial Administration Rule 4-903 
Uniform Custody Evaluations 
(3) Evaluators must consider and respond to each of the 
following factors: 
A. The child7s preference; 
B. The benefit of keeping siblings together; 
C. The relative strength of the child's bond with one 
or both of the perspective custodians; 
D. The general interest in continuing previously 
determined custody arrangements where the child is 
happy and well adjusted; 
E. Factors relating to the perspective custodians 
character status or their capacity or willingness 
to function as parents, including: 
(i) Moral character and emotional stability; 
(ii) Duration and depth of desire for custody; 
(iii) Ability to provide personal rather than 
surrogate care; 
(iv) Significant impairment of ability to function 
as a parent through drug abuse, excessive 
drinking or other causes; 
(v) Reasons for having relinquished custody in 
the past; 
(vi) Religious incompatibility with the child; 
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(vii) Kinship; 
(viii) Financial condition. 
F. Any other factors deemed important by the 
evaluator, the parties or the Court. 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
The trial court's custody award will not be disturbed on 
appeal absent an abuse of discretion or manifest injustice. 
Sukin v. Sukin, 842 P.2d 922, 923 (Utah App. 1992). 
The trial court must act in accordance with the legal 
standards set by the appellate courts, and the trial court 
must set forth the reasons for its decision in adequate 
findings of fact and conclusions of law. Schindler v. 
Schindler, 776 P.2d 84, 87 (Utah App. 1989). 
In making custody determinations, the trial court must 
consider the best interests of the child. Moon v. Moon, 790 
P.2d 52, 54 (Utah App. 1990). 
"[C]ustody determinations are so fact-sensitive, there is no 
required set of conditions which the court must consider . . 
." Schindler v. Schindler, 776 P.2d 84, 88 (Utah App. 
1989) . What factors are applicable and how much weight they 
should be given lies within the discretion of the trial 
court. Id. at 88. 
ff[U]nless it appears that trial court has given short-shrift 
to the statutory criteria, we accord considerable discretion 
to the trial court in making a custody decision because of 
its first-hand proximity to the people involved." Moon v. 
Moon 790 P.2d 52, 55 (Utah App. 1990). 
The weight and credibility given to expert testimony must be 
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determined by the trier of fact. Yelderman v. Yelderman. 
669 P.2d 406, 408 (Utah 1983). See also Moon v. Moon. 790 
P.2d 52, 55 (Utah App. 1990); Deeben v. Deeben, 772 P.2d 
972, 973-74 n. 3 (Utah App. 1989). 
ff[I]n custody determinations, trial courts must examine a 
child's need for stability, and therefore consider prior 
custody arrangements, including duration of those 
arrangements, and the potential harm to the child if the 
arrangement is changed." Paryzek v. Paryzek. 776 P.2d 78, 
82 (Utah App. 1989). 
This court applies an abuse of discretion standard in 
reviewing the trial court's orders regarding visitation. 
The trial court is granted broad discretion but must 
exercise that discretion within the legal standards set by 
the appellate courts. Peterson v. Peterson, 818 P.2d 1305, 
1308 (Utah App. 1991). 
Visitation orders must be based on the child's best 
interests. "Courts must give priority over the desires of 
either parent in determining visitation rights." Peterson 
v. Peterson. 818 P.2d 1305, 1308 (Utah App. 1991) (quoting 
Riche v. Riche. 784 P.2d 465, 469 (Utah App. 1989)). 
The court must set a visitation schedule that is "realistic 
and reasonable and provide[s] an adequate basis for 
preserving and fostering the child's relationship with the 
noncustodial parent." Ebbert v. Ebbert. 744 P.2d 1019, 1022 
(Utah App. 1987). 
In a divorce action, the trial court is given substantial 
3 
discretion to equitably adjust the parties financial and 
property interests. Watson v. Watson, 837 P.2d 1# 5 (Utah 
App. 1992). 
12. The appellate courts will only disturb the trial court's 
determination "*if there was a misunderstanding or 
misapplication of the law resulting in substantial and 
prejudicial error, the evidence clearly preponderated 
against the findings, or such a serious inequity has 
resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion.'" 
Watson v. Watson, 837 P.2d 1, 5 (quoting Naranio v. Naranio, 
751 P.2d 1144, 1146 (Utah App. 1988). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This action is an appeal from a Decree of Divorce and Order 
Denying Motion for a New Trial entered in the Third Judicial 
District Court, Salt Lake County. The plaintiff/appellant filed 
the Complaint on November 5, 1990. The defendant/appellee filed 
a complaint January 30, 1991. Both actions were consolidated by 
the court's order on February 8, 1991. The defendant's complaint 
was treated as a counterclaim. The court granted the plaintiff 
temporary custody of the parties minor child, Paige. Defendant 
was awarded visitation. 
The trial began May 28, 1992 and ended June 2, 1992 with the 
Court having heard testimony from eleven different witnesses plus 
the parties. At trial, the parties stipulated that no alimony 
will be paid, that the defendant will maintain health and 
accident insurance for Paige, that the parties will share equally 
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all medical and dental expenses not covered by insurance, and 
that the parties will receive the personal property as divided 
at that time. (Judge's Ruling, T. 2-3). 
The defendant's counsel prepared the Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Decree of Divorce, which the court signed 
on July 5th, 1992. Defendant was awarded permanent custody of 
Paige, and plaintiff was awarded visitation and ordered to pay 
child support in accordance with the Uniform Child Support 
Guidelines. Plaintiff was also ordered to pay defendant $1,500, 
which was one-half of Dr. Elizabeth Stewart's fee for performing 
the custody evaluation. The court denied the plaintiff's 
request to be reimbursed by defendant for contested child care 
expenses. Plaintiff moved for a new trial and objected to the 
findings of fact. The court denied the plaintiff's motion on 
September 8, 1992. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The plaintiff and defendant were married March 9, 1990 in 
Salt Lake County. Four days after the wedding, plaintiff decided 
that she had made a mistake and no longer wanted to be married 
because of religious differences and financial concerns. (R. 
467-468 or Vol. I, T. 142-43). Plaintiff remained with defendant 
for approximately three months, and left the defendant on June 9, 
1990. (R. 329 or Vol. I, T. 4). When she left the marriage, 
plaintiff was pregnant with the parties' minor child, Paige, who 
was born December 18, 1990. (R. 330 or Vol. I, T. 5). 
2. Plaintiff did not notify the defendant of Paige's birth 
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until four days after she was born. Plaintiff entered the 
hospital under an assumed name and ordered hospital personnel not 
to allow the defendant to see her or Paige. (R. 662-663 or Vol. 
II, T. 157-58). Plaintiff selected the name Paige without 
consulting the defendant or allowing him to participate in 
choosing a name. (R. 664 or Vol. II, T. 159). 
3. Plaintiff was granted temporary custody of Paige pending the 
trial court/s decision. Defendant was granted visitation. 
Plaintiff interfered often with defendant's visitation rights. 
(R. 665-668 or Vol. II, T. 160-63). 
4. On June 11, 1991, plaintiff and defendant stipulated and 
agreed to appoint Dr. Elizabeth Stewart as custody evaluator. 
Defendant was to bear the initial costs with the final 
determination of payment left to time of trial. (R. 36). 
5. In making her evaluation, Dr. Stewart interviewed the 
plaintiff five times. She interviewed the defendant twice. She 
observed Paige with each parent and with h€>r half-sister, Brandi. 
Dr. Stewart also interviewed plaintiff's mother, Kaye Pack; 
plaintiff's father and step-mother; Paige's pediatrician; and 
Paige's daycare provider. In addition, Dr. Stewart performed 
diagnostic evaluation tests such as the MMPI, Rotter sentence 
completion, and a custody questionnaire. (R. 427-429 or Vol. I, 
T. 102-04). 
6. Dr. Stewart considered the factors set out in the Rule 4-903 
of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration relating to custody 
evaluations. (R. 429 or Vol. I, T. 104). Dr. Stewart 
recommended that custody be granted to the defendant based on her 
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observations viewed in light of the statutory factors. (R. 434 
or Vol. I, T. 109). 
7. At trial, plaintiff called Dr. Paula Swaner and Dr. Joanna 
McManemin, both clinical psychologists, who challenged Dr. 
Stewart's recommendation. Neither Dr. Swaner nor Dr. McManemin 
made third-party contacts, observed Paige with either parent, or 
completed a custody evaluation. (R. 172-73). 
8. The substantial number of witnesses who testified at trial, 
including Lloyd Pack (Plaintiff's natural father), Richard Woods 
(Plaintiff's ex-husband), Carolyn Pack (Plaintiff's stepmother), 
and Christie Lynn Pack (Plaintiff's stepsister) all substantiated 
the observations made by Dr. Stewart. 
9. Plaintiff claimed that the defendant owed her for daycare 
costs paid to plaintiff's mother for Paige's care. However, at 
trial the court heard conflicting evidence as to whether these 
costs had been incurred. (R. 411-412 or Vol. I, T. 86-87; R. 
565, 642 or Vol. II, T. 59, 136; also Exhibit No. 10) 
10. At the time of trial, plaintiff's monthly income was $1,456. 
Defendant's monthly income was $2,393. (R. 171) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court acted properly and within its discretion in 
deciding this case. Appellate courts will not disturb the trial 
court's decisions regarding custody, visitation and property 
distribution absent an abuse of discretion or manifest injustice. 
Neither situation exists here. 
In making its custody determination, the trial court 
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carefully considered the evidence before it and made detailed 
findings of fact to support its ruling. The trial court did not 
abuse its discretion by relying on Dr. Elizabeth Stewart's 
recommendations rather than Dr. Paula Swaner's and Dr. Joanna 
McManemin's testimony. The task of determining the credibility 
of the numerous witnesses and what weight to give their testimony 
belongs to the trier of fact. The trial court adequately 
considered Paige's need for stability and the effect of dividing 
her from her half-sister and made the necessary findings. 
The trial court acted within its discretion in establishing 
the visitation schedule. The court determined that it was in 
Paige's best interest to not grant the plaintiff overnight 
visitation at this time and to follow, with modification, the 
visitation schedule recommended by Dr. Stewart. 
The trial court did not commit error by requiring the 
plaintiff to reimburse the defendant for half of Dr. Stewart's 
custody evaluation fees. The trial court's distribution of 
property in a divorce is presumed to be valid. The appellate 
courts will not overturn the trial court's distribution unless 
the court has misapplied the law so as to cause severe and 
prejudicial error, the evidence preponderates against the 
findings, or the distribution will cause inequity sufficient to 
manifest an abuse of discretion. The trial court made no such 
errors and acted well within its discretion. 
The trial court acted properly in denying the plaintiff's 
claim against the defendant for alleged child care expenses. The 
plaintiff failed to meet her burden of proving that the expenses 
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were actually spent on child care. The trial court heard 
conflicting evidence regarding the expenses and acted properly in 
denying plaintiff's claim. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY AWARDING 
CUSTODY OF THE PARTIES' CHILD TO THE APPELLEE. 
Trial courts are granted broad discretion in determining 
custody. The trial court's custody award will not be disturbed 
on appeal absent an abuse of discretion or manifest injustice. 
Sukin v. Sukin, 842 P.2d 922, 923 (Utah App. 1992). However, the 
trial court's discretion is limited in two ways. First, the 
trial court must act in accordance with the legal standards set 
by the appellate courts. Secondly, the trial court must set 
forth the reasons for its decision in adequate findings of fact 
and conclusions of law. Schindler v. Schindler, 776 P.2d 84, 87 
(Utah App. 1989). Findings may be stated orally and recorded in 
court or may appear in a memorandum decision or opinion. Jensen 
v. Jensen. 775 P.2d 436, 438 (Utah App. 1989). 
In making custody determinations, the trial court must 
consider the best interests of the child. In addition to Rule 4-
903 of the Code of Judicial Administration, the Utah courts have 
developed a number of factors that may assist the trial court in 
making its determination. These factors include: 
The need for stability in custodial relationship and 
environment; maintaining an existing primary custodial bond; 
the relative strength of parental bonds; 
The relative abilities of the parents to provide care, 
supervision, and a suitable environment for the children and 
to meet the needs of the children; 
Preference of a child able to evaluate the custody question; 
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The benefits of keeping siblings together, enabling sibling 
bonds to form; 
The character and emotional stability of the custodian; and 
The desire for custody; the apparent commitment of the 
proposed custodian to parenting. 
Moon v. Moon. 790 P.2d 52, 54 (Utah App. 1990) (citations 
omitted). However, "custody determinations are so fact-
sensitive, there is no required set of conditions which the court 
must consider . . . " Schindler v. Schindler, 776 P.2d 84, 88 
(Utah App. 1989). What factors are applicable and how much 
weight they should be given lies within the discretion of the 
trial court. Id. at 88. According to this Court, "As an 
appellate court, we are limited in our institutional ability to 
come to grips with these considerations, whereas the trial court 
is in a much better position to gain the necessary understanding 
to make the best decision possible under the circumstances." 
Moon, 790 P.2d at 54. 
The plaintiff attacks the trial court's decision regarding 
custody essentially on three grounds. First, the plaintiff 
argues that the trial court abused its discretion by relying on 
Dr. Stewart's recommendation rather than Dr. Swaner's and Dr. 
McManemin's opinions. Secondly, the plaintiff contends that the 
court abused its discretion by awarding custody to the defendant 
because the court failed to consider Paige's need for stability. 
Thirdly, the plaintiff argues that it was an abuse of discretion 
for the trial court to award custody without adequately 
considering the effect of splitting Paige and her half-sister, 
Brandi. 
A. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Giving Dr. 
Stewart's Custody Recommendation Greater Weight Than Dr. 
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Swaner's or Dr. McManemin's Testimony. 
Plaintiff contends that the trial court abused its 
discretion by not accepting Dr. Swaner's and Dr. McManemin's 
opinions over Dr. Stewart's. However, the weight and credibility 
given to expert testimony must be determined by the trier of 
fact. Yelderman v. Yelderman. 669 P.2d 406, 408 (Utah 1983). See 
also Moon v. Moon. 790 P.2d 52, 55 (Utah App. 1990); Deeben v. 
Deeben, 772 P.2d 972, 973-74 n. 3 (Utah App. 1989). 
Swaner and McManemin both testified that in their opinion 
custody of Paige should be awarded to the plaintiff. However, 
neither Swaner nor McManemin performed a custody evaluation in 
this case. They spoke only with the plaintiff. They did not 
interview the defendant or any third parties. They did not 
observe Paige in the company of both parents. 
Stewart recommended that custody be awarded to the 
defendant. Pursuant to the parties' stipulation of June 11, 
1991, Stewart performed a custody evaluation. She spoke with 
both parents more than once. In fact, Stewart met with the 
plaintiff five times. She observed each parent with Paige. 
Stewart interviewed plaintiff's mother, plaintiff's father and 
step-mother, Paige's pediatrician, and Paige's daycare provider. 
She also performed an MMPI and a Rotter sentence completion test 
on Paige and had both parties fill out a custody questionnaire. 
(R. 427-429 or Vol. I, T. 102-04). 
In reaching her recommendation, Stewart considered the 
factors set forth in Rule 4-903 of the Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration regarding uniform custody evaluations. At trial, 
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Stewart testified extensively about how these statutory factors 
applied in this case. (Vol. I, T. 104-23). 
Plaintiff essentially argues that the trial court abused its 
discretion by choosing not to rely on her witnesses. The trial 
court, however, had the opportunity to personally observe the 
witnesses testify. The trial court is in the best position to 
determine the credibility of witnesses and the proper weight to 
give their testimony. "[U]nless it appears that trial court has 
given short-shrift to the statutory criteria, we accord 
considerable discretion to the trial court in making a custody 
decision because of its first-hand proximity to the people 
involved." Moon v. Moon 790 P.2d 52, 55 (Utah App. 1990). 
In this case, the trial court determined that the testimony 
of Dr. Stewart was more credible than that of Drs. Swaner and 
McManemin. A review of the trial transcript supports the trial 
court's decision. The trial court acted well within its 
discretion in choosing to rely on Dr. Stewart's recommendation. 
The record indicates no abuse of this discretion, therefore this 
court should not overturn the trial court's custody award. 
B. The Trial Court Adequately Considered Paige's Need for 
Stability in Reaching Its Decision. 
The child's need for stability is a critical factor in 
awarding custody. In Paryzek v. Paryzek. 776 P.2d 78 (Utah App. 
1989), this Court held that "in custody determinations, trial 
courts must examine a child's need for stability, and therefore 
consider prior custody arrangements, including duration of those 
arrangements, and the potential harm to the child if the 
arrangement is changed." Id. at 82. This Court, however, noted 
in Schindler v. Schindler that although the identity of the 
primary caretaker prior to trial is significant, it is not 
dispositive. 776 P.2d 84, 87 (Utah App. 1989). 
In this case, the trial court adequately considered Paige's 
need for stability. In its ruling, the court stated, 
Changing the custodial arrangements can certainly be 
traumatic, and I am certainly aware of that problem. 
However, I believe that the persuasive evidence here has 
established that in Paige's case, being now 18 months old, 
she can make the transition from one household to the other 
without the typical attendant trauma. She has not yet 
developed a sense of belonging or ownership to one parent as 
opposed to the other. Indeed, most of her life she has been 
cared for by surrogates, her grandmother and then day care 
and has moved, made the transition from the plaintiff's to 
the defendant's home without convincing evidence of trauma 
during visitation exercised. 
(R. 795 or Judge's Ruling, T. 10). The trial court also noted 
that the defendant is emotionally more stable than the plaintiff 
and is more likely to provide a stable home environment for Paige 
(R. 792 or Judge's Ruling, T. 7). 
Stability is a critical factor in determining the best 
interests of a child in a custody dispute. However, although 
significant, the identity of the primary care-taker is not 
dispositive. The trial court is required to examine the child's 
need for stability. In this case, the trial court adequately 
considered Paige's need for stability. The trial court is in the 
best position to make such determinations and this Courts grants 
it broad discretion. Because the trial court adequately 
considered Paige's need for stability, based on the evidence 
before it, this Court should not overturn the custody award. 
C. The Trial Court Adequately Considered the Effect of Dividing 
Siblings. 
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The trial court adequately considered the effect that 
dividing Brandi and Paige might have on Paige. Although fl[t]he 
desirability of keeping siblings together is a legitimate factor 
to consider in deciding custody . . . the preference for keeping 
siblings together is not binding when other considerations favor 
dividing them." Merriam v. Merriam, 799 P.2d 1172 (Utah App. 
1990). 
Dr. Stewart testified that at the time of trial Paige was 
too young to have developed a sibling relationship with Brandi. 
(R. 4330-432 or Vol. I, T. 105-07). Additionally, Dr. Stewart 
noted that the plaintiff had chosen to provide the children with 
separate daycare providers. Brandy went to daycare and Paige 
stayed with the plaintiffs mother. (R. 433 or Vol. I, T. 108). 
The children were cared for together at daycare only after Dr. 
Stewart released her evaluation report. (R. 441 or Vol. I, T. 
116) . 
The trial court determined, based on the evidence before it, 
that Paige had not developed a sibling relationship with Brandi, 
and that transferring Paige to the defendant's home would cause 
no undue trauma or harm. (R. 174) Additionally, the trial court 
determined that there were other more important factors that 
favored dividing the children. 
The trial court found that the plaintiff had exhibited 
emotional volatility and instability, (R. 175); had negative and 
exclusionary attitudes towards men, (R. 173); had dysfunctional 
family relationships, (R. 176); and had conveyed negative 
attitudes regarding the defendant to Brandi and would likely 
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convey those same attitudes to Paige. The court found the 
defendant to have a better and more realistic appreciation of the 
value of family life than the plaintiff, (R. 173); to be less 
impulsive and more sensitive to the concerns of others, (R. 174); 
to have rational views of the plaintiff and not convey any 
negative feelings he had toward the plaintiff to Paige, (R. 175); 
and to have a more flexible work schedule than the plaintiff 
which would result in less surrogate care for Paige than she 
would have if she remained with the plaintiff, (R. 175-76). 
In this case, the trial court determined that because of 
Paige's age, she had not developed a sibling relationship 
sufficient to cause her undue trauma if her custody was 
transferred to the defendant. Even had this not been the case, 
the trial court still would have acted within its discretion 
because of the other factors that favored placing Paige with the 
defendant. The trial court has not abused its discretion by 
dividing Paige and Brandi, and this Court should not overturn the 
trial court's custody award. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN SETTING 
VISITATION OR IN DENYING OVERNIGHT VISITATION. 
This court applies an abuse of discretion standard in 
reviewing the trial court's orders regarding visitation. The 
trial court is granted broad discretion but must exercise that 
discretion within the legal standards set by the appellate 
courts. Peterson v. Peterson. 818 P.2d 1305, 1308 (Utah App. 
1991). 
The legal standards established for visitation orders 
require that orders be based on the child's best interests• 
"Courts must give priority over the desires of either parent in 
determining visitation rights." Id. (quoting Riche v. Riche, 784 
P.2d 465, 469 (Utah App. 1989)). The court must set a visitation 
schedule that is "realistic and reasonable and provide[s] an 
adequate basis for preserving and fostering the child's 
relationship with the noncustodial parent," Ebbert v. Ebbert, 
744 P.2d 1019, 1022 (Utah App. 1987). 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in setting the 
visitation schedule. The plaintiff characterizes the visitation 
award as restrictive. However, the court modified Dr. Stewart's 
recommended schedule to allow the plaintiff more visitation time. 
The visitation schedule is no more restrictive than the then 
existing district court's standard visitation schedule. (R. 477 
or Vol. I, T. 152). 
Plaintiff also objects to the court's refusal to permit 
overnight visitation. The court, however, heard the plaintiff 
herself testify that overnight visitation was not appropriate for 
a child as young as Paige. (R. 334-335 or Vol. I, T. 9-10). 
Finally, the plaintiff argues that the trial court is attempting 
to punish her by granting less visitation time than the defendant 
was awarded pending trial. Nothing in the record bears this out. 
The trial court must consider the child's best interests in 
setting visitation, not the parent's interests. If the defendant 
was granted a different visitation schedule than the plaintiff it 
was because the court considered that arrangement in Paige's best 
interest. The trial court is not now obligated to award the 
16 
plaintiff the same amount of visitation as awarded the defendant. 
To serve Paige's best interests, the trial court must award 
visitation that allows her to preserve and foster her 
relationship with the plaintiff. The trial court's visitation 
schedule does not unduly interfere with this relationship. 
Plaintiff works during the week from approximately 8:30 am to 6 
pm. (R. 395 or Vol. I, T. 70). When the plaintiff had temporary 
custody of Paige, she did not spend many more waking hours with 
her than she is allowed under the visitation schedule. 
The court adopted Dr. Stewart's visitation schedule with the 
addition of Saturday afternoon based on the findings it made 
regarding both parties' ability to provide Paige a stable and 
healthy home and testimony before it that overnight visitation 
could be detrimental to Paige. The evidence supports the trial 
court's visitation schedule. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY REQUIRING 
PLAINTIFF TO PAY HALF OF THE COSTS FOR THE CUSTODY 
EVALUATION. 
The trial court did not commit an abuse of discretion by 
requiring the plaintiff to pay half of Dr. Stewart's fee, $1,500, 
to the defendant. In a divorce action, the trial court is given 
substantial discretion to equitably adjust the parties financial 
and property interests. Watson v. Watson, 837 P.2d 1, 5 (Utah 
App. 1992). The trial court's distribution is "endowed with a 
presumption of validity." Rasband v. Rasband. 752 P.2d 1331 
(Utah App. 1988). The appellate courts will only disturb the 
trial court's determination ,Mif there was a misunderstanding or 
17 
misapplication of the law resulting in substantial and 
prejudicial error, the evidence clearly preponderated against the 
findings, or such a serious inequity has resulted as to manifest 
a clear abuse of discretion.'" Watson. 837 P.2d at 5 (quoting 
Naranio v. Naranio. 751 P.2d 1144, 1146 (Utah App. 1988). 
In this case, the trial court determined, based on the 
evidence before it, that the plaintiff should pay $1,500, which 
was half of Dr. Stewart's fee. The court found that the parties 
had agreed to equally share all of Paige's health care costs not 
covered by insurance, to pay no alimony, and to award all 
property as then divided. The court determined that in light of 
the parties' desire to share costs and not fight over who owned 
what that the most equitable arrangement would be to split Dr. 
Stewart's fee equally. 
Although the defendant earns more per month than the 
plaintiff, the court still acted well within its discretion by 
dividing Dr. Stewart's fee equally between the parties. The 
evidence does not clearly preponderate against the court's 
conclusion, nor has the plaintiff suffered an inequity that 
clearly manifests an abuse of discretion. This court should not 
substitute its judgment for that of the trial court, but should 
affirm the judgment of the trial court. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED PLAINTIFF'S DEMAND FOR 
DAYCARE EXPENSES. 
The trial court did not commit error by failing to grant 
plaintiff a judgment for her alleged daycare costs. The trial 
court found that plaintiff failed to meet her burden of proving 
18 
that her claimed expenses were in fact for child care. In the 
face of conflicting evidence, the court acted properly in denying 
plaintiff's demand. 
At trial, plaintiff presented cancelled checks, each for 
$100, payable to plaintiff's mother, Kaye Pack. Plaintiff 
claimed the checks represented child care expenses. However, on 
cross-examination, plaintiff admitted that she had never paid her 
mother for caring for her other child, Brandi. (R. 411-412 or 
Vol. I, T. 86-87). Kaye Pack testified that she informed the 
loan institution that financed the plaintiff's mortgage that she 
was not charging the plaintiff for day care. (R. 565 or Vol. II, 
T. 59 also Exhibit No. 10). Plaintiff's half-sister, Christie 
Pack, testified that the plaintiff had told her that she paid 
$100 a month to her mother to pay for food that her mother 
prepared for plaintiff's and the children's dinners. (R. 641-642 
or Vol. II, T. 135-36). Given this evidence, it was clear that 
the day care expenses as claimed by the plaintiff was nothing 
more than a sham. 
In light of such conflicting evidence, the trial court ruled 
properly that plaintiff failed to meet her burden of proof. The 
trial court committed no error, nor did the trial court abuse its 
discretion. This court grants the trial court broad discretion 
in weighing the evidence before it and should affirm the trial 
court's ruling regarding plaintiff's alleged daycare expenses. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court fully considered Paige's best interests in 
19 
awarding her custody to the defendant. Absent an abuse of 
discretion or manifest injustice, the appellate courts will not 
overturn the trial courts custody awards. The trial court acted 
well within its discretion in determining Paige's custody. It 
made detailed findings of fact and considered all relevant 
factors in making its determination. This Court should affirm the 
trial court's custody award. 
The trial court also acted properly in establishing the 
plaintiff's visitation schedule and in denying plaintiff 
overnight visitation at this time. Visitation awards are granted 
the same deference as custody awards. The trial court acted 
within its discretion in setting visitation and this Court should 
affirm its ruling. 
Finally, the trial court acted properly in requiring 
plaintiff to pay half of Dr. Stewart's fee and in denying the 
plaintiff's claim for alleged child care expenses. These rulings 
should be affirmed. 
For the above reasons, defendant respectfully asks this 
Court to affirm the decision of the trial court. 
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2 THE COURT: The p a r t i e s and t h e i r c o u n s e l a r e 
3 p r e s e n t . 
4
 Having t a k e n t h i s m a t t e r unde r a d v i s e m e n t , f u r t h e r 
5 c o n s i d e r e d the e x h i b i t s r e c e i v e d , the t e s t i m o n y e l i c i t e d , 
6 I am p r e p a r e d t o r u l e a t t h i s t i m e . 
7 I n t h i s m a t t e r t he p l a i n t i f f T o r i E v a n s , now known as 
8 Woods, s e e k s a d i v o r c e from the d e f e n d a n t on the g rounds 
9 of i r r e c o n c i l a b l e d i f f e r e n c e s i n the i n s t a n t m a t t e r , t h a t 
10 i s , t h i s case number D-90-4449 , f i l e d on November the 5th of 
11 1 9 9 0 , 
12 In ca se number D-91-2 5 f i l e d on J a n u a r y the 30 th of 
13 1991 , the p l a i n t i f f i n t h a t a c t i o n , Robe r t E v a n s , s e e k s the 
14 same r e l i e f . 
15 The two a c t i o n s were c o n s o l i d a t e d by o r d e r of t h i s 
16 Cour t on the 8 t h of F e b r u a r y of 1991 . The Complaint i n the 
17 l a t e r a c t i o n f i l e d i s t r e a t e d h e r e i n as a C o u n t e r c l a i m . 
18 The e v i d e n c e e s t a b l i s h e s t h a t b o t h p a r t i e s a r e 
19 e n t i t l e d t o a d i v o r c e on the g rounds of i r r e c o n c i l a b l e 
20 d i f f e r e n c e s a n d e a c h i s g r a n t e d t h e s a m e . 
21 The p a r t i e s have s t i p u l a t e d on t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e income^ 
22 f o r p u r p o s e s of s u p p o r t p u r s u a n t t o t h e U n i f o r m C h i l d 
23 S u p p o r t G u i d e l i n e s s e t f o r t h i n E x h i b i t 6, t h e w o r k s h e e t . 
24 A d d i t i o n a l l y , t h e y have a g r e e d t h a t no a l i m o n y s h o u l d be 
25 a w a r d e d , t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t i s t o m a i n t a i n h e a l t h a n d a c c i d e n 
i n s u r a n c e on the c h i l d P a i g e , t h a t the p a r t i e s a re t o s h a r e 
e q u a l l y the c o s t of a l l m e d i c a l , d e n t a l e x p e n s e s not cove red 
by i n s u r a n c e , t h a t the p e r s o n a l p r o p e r t y a s c u r r e n t l y 
d i v i d e d i s t o be awarded t o the r e s p e c t i v e p a r t i e s , and these ] 
s t i p u l a t i o n s a re a c c e p t e d by t h i s C o u r t . 
The p a r t i e s r e s e r v e d f o r t r i a l the payment of Dr. 
S t e w a r t ' s f e e s which were i n i t i a l l y p a i d by the d e f e n d a n t . 
T h i s Cour t now o r d e r s the p l a i n t i f f t o r e i m b u r s e the 
d e f e n d a n t f o r o n e - h a l f of s a i d c o s t s p r o f f e r e d a t the sum of 
$ 3 , 0 0 0 . Judgment i s awarded in b e h a l f of the d e f e n d a n t 
a g a i n s t the p l a i n t i f f i n the amount of $ 1 , 5 0 0 . 
A d d i t i o n a l l y , the p l a i n t i f f c l a i m s the d e f e n d a n t owes 
h e r f o r c e r t a i n c h i l d c a r e e x p e n s e s i n c u r r e d by payments t o 
h e r mother s e t f o r t h i n E x h i b i t 3 . The e v i d e n c e i s 
c o n f l i c t i n g a s t o w h e t h e r or not t h e s e sums, $ 1 , 1 0 0 , were 
p a i d f o r P a i g e f s c a r e o n l y . The p l a i n t i f f , i n t h i s C o u r t ' s 
v i e w , has f a i l e d in h e r bu rden of c o n v i n c i n g t h i s Cour t 
t h a t t h i s was the c a s e . A c c o r d i n g l y , t h a t c l a i m i s d e n i e d . 
The o v e r r i d i n g i s s u e in b o t h d i v o r c e a c t i o n s i s the 
c l a i m f o r c u s t o d y of Paige
 ? the p a r t i e s 1 minor d a u g h t e r , 
whose d a t e of b i r t h i s December the 18 th of 1990. The 
p a r t i e s , by s t i p u l a t i o n of June the 2 1 s t of 1 9 9 1 , a g r e e d t o 
have an i n d e p e n d e n t c u s t o d y e v a l u a t i o n p u r s u a n t t o Rule 
4-903 of the Code of J u d i c i a l A d m i n i s t r a t i o n t o be c o n d u c t e d 
by E l i z a b e t h S t e w a r t , PhD. p s y c h o l o g i s t , which was a c c o m p l i s h e d 
r x i N H ^ Q Q 
1 and the report filed on January the 1-th of 1992 and 
2 received as Exhibit 8. 
3 This is a close case. Neither parent here is a 
4 "bad" parent. Both have many commendable attributes, but 
5 unfortunately, i t falls upon this Court to decide the 
6 custody issue, and I must decide that issue in accord 
7 with what I deem to be the best interests of the minor 
8 child Paige who is , after a l l , my primary concern. 
9 Dr. Stewart testified that in preparation of her 
10 report, she conducted interviews with the defendant, with the 
11 defendant's mother, with the plaintiff, some five different 
12 times, with the plaintiff 's mother, with the plaintiff 's 
13 father, the pediatrician of the child Dr. Thomas, the day 
14 care provider, the plaintiff 's stepmother. She observed 
15 Paige in the presence of both parents. She observed 
16 Paige with her stepsister Brandie. She performed diagnostic 
17 evaluation tests including the MMPI, the Rotter sentence 
18 completion test , custody questionnaire, and these activities 
19 were performed over a course of two to three months, a 
20 period from October of '91 to and including December of '91. 
21 Dr. Stewart's recommendations are challenged by Dr. 
22 Swaner , p l a i n t i f f ' s p s y c h o t h e r a p i s t f o r two y e a r s , who, by 
23 her own admission, hasn't observed the child in relation 
24 to either parent, made no third-party contacts, only saw the 
25 defendant twice, and is unaware of the requirements of 
1 Rule 4-903, Code of Judicial Administration, and has done 
2 no custody evaluations since 1988, 
3 Dr. McManemin likewise challenges Dr. Stewart's 
4 recommendations, yet by her testimony has had no contact 
5 with the defendant, made no third-party contacts, 
6 observed no parental interaction with the child, and only 
7 did an evaluation of Brandie for approximate ly two and 
8 one-half hours about two weeks ago. 
9 Experts, of course, disagree in this case. This 
10 Court, therefore, must conclude which recommendations are 
11 more satisfactory, convicing and persuasive . In deciding 
12 custody cases between competing parents, this Court must 
13 consider a number of factors which are set forth in 
14 Rule 4-903, Code of Judicial Administration, and those 
15 factors are as follows, inter alia, the preference of the 
16 child, the benefit of the siblings remaining together, 
17 the strength of the child's bond to the respective parents, 
18 the benefits and/or disadvantages of continuing the present 
19 custody arrangement, the moral and/or emotional stabil i ty 
20 of the parents, the duration of the desire for custody, 
21 the necessity of surrogate care for the child, the presence 
22 or lack thereof of substance abuse or use, i l l i c i t substance 
23 abuse or use, whether custody was relinquished in the past 
24 by either of the parents, the religious compatability with 
25 the child, the kinship relationships of the child, and the 
1 f i n a n c i a l a b i l i t y of the p a r e n t s t o s u p p o r t the c h i l d 
2 and t h e m s e l v e s , and any o t h e r f a c t o r s c o n s i d e r e d i m p o r t a n t 
3 w h i c h , i n t h i s C o u r t ' s v i e w , Dr. S t e w a r t has done in h e r 
4
 e x t e n s i v e r e p o r t and t e s t i m o n y . The o t h e r e x p e r t s have n o t . 
5 P u r s u a n t t o T i l e 3 0 - 3 - 1 0 and f o l l o w i n g of the Utah 
6 Code Anno ta t ed a s i n t e r p r e t e d by case l aw , most n o t a b l y 
7 in the case of Moon v e r s u s Moon found a t 7 90 P. 2d. 52, a 
8 1990 c a s e , t h i s Cour t must c o n s i d e r , i n d e c i d i n g what i s 
9 i n the b e s t i n t e r e s t s of the c h i l d , i n a d d i t i o n t o t hose 
10 f a c t o r s s e t f o r t h in Rule 4 -903 , a d d i t i o n a l e l e m e n t s . 
11 T h i s Cour t has done so and f i n d s as f o l l o w s , and no t 
12 n e c e s s a r i l y i n the o r d e r d e l i n e a t e d i n the Moon c a s e . 
13 The p a r e n t bond be tween the c h i l d and the two p a r e n t s 
14 here i s e q u a l l y s t r o n g . Both p a r t i e s have a p o s i t i v e 
t5 sense of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o P a i g e ' s n u r t u r i n g and p r o t e c t i o n . 
1
*> J The q u a l i t y of P a i g e ' s p r e s e n t c u s t o d i a l a r r a n g e m e n t , even 
though Paige has b e e n , s i n c e F e b r u a r y of 1992, a f t e r Dr. 
S t e w a r t ' s r e p o r t was i s s u e d , been p l a c e d i n day c a r e r a t h e r 
19 t h a n in the ca re of the p l a i n t i f f ' s m o t h e r , t h i s a r r a n g e m e n t , 
20 i n t h i s C o u r t ' s v iew, i s p r o b l e m a t i c . 
21 The p l a i n t i f f ' s a t t i t u d e toward the d e f e n d a n t , which 
22
 i s undu ly i n f l u e n c e d by h e r m o t h e r , i s n e g a t i v e and 
23 e x c l u s i o n a r y . Pfer u n r e a s o n a b l e r e s t r i c t i o n s on v i s i t a t i o n 
24 i s one example of he r a n t a g o n i s m toward the r e l a t i o n s h i p 
25 of Paige t o h e r f a t h e r . 
17 
18 
1 These f a c t o r s , c o n v i n c i n g l y e x p r e s s e d by Dr. S t e w a r t 
2 i n b o t h h e r r e p o r t and h e r t e s t i m o n y , i n t h i s C o u r t ' s v i ew , 
3 o u t w e i g h the c i r c u m s t a n c e of the c h i l d h a v i n g been i n the 
4
 t e m p o r a r y c u s t o d y of h e r mo the r d u r i n g the pendency of 
5 t h e s e p r o c e e d i n g s . The e m o t i o n a l s t a b i l i t y and the 
6 c h a r a c t e r of the d e f e n d a n t , i n t h i s C o u r t ' s v i e w , i s s u p e r i o r 
7 t o t h a t of the p l a i n t i f f . 
8 While b o t h p a r e n t s a re r e s o u r c e f u l , e c o n o m i c a l l y and 
9 p s y c h o l o g i c a l l y i n d e p e n d e n t , the d e f e n d a n t i s e m o t i o n a l l y 
10 more s t a b l e . He has a b e t t e r , more r e a l i s t i c a p p r e c i a t i o n 
11 of the va lue of f a m i l y l i f e and i s more l i k e l y t o p roduce a 
12 s t a b l e home e n v i r o n m e n t w i t h p o s i t i v e s o c i a l and e m o t i o n a l 
13 d e v e l o p m e n t on b e h a l f of the c h i l d P a i g e . He s e t s , a s Dr. 
14 S t e w a r t has c o n v i n c i n g l y t e s t i f i e d , l o n g - r a n g e goe.ls , 
15 i s r a t i o n a l in h i s a p p r o a c h t o p r o b l e m s , and n o t v u l n e r a b l e 
16 t o change in s t a n d a r d s . He i s l e s s i m p u l s i v e and more 
17 s e n s i t i v e t o the c o n c e r n s of o t h e r p e o p l e . 
18
 P l a i n t i f f , on the o t h e r hand , the e v i d e n c e has 
19 e s t a b l i s h e d , h a s e v i d e n c e d e m o t i o n a l v o l a t i l i t y and an 
20 i n s e n s i t i v i t y t o t h e f e e l i n g s of o t h e r s . She i s p r i m a r i l y 
21 c o n c e r n e d w i t h h e r own economic c o m f o r t . Her judgment i s 
22 f l a w e d , a s h a s b e e n t e s t i f i e d t o c o n v i n c i n g l y by D r . S t e w a r t , 
23 by c o n f l i c t i n g v a l u e s . She s e r i o u s l y m i s t r u s t s m e n . Her 
24 p r o b l e m - s o l v i n g i s i m p e r i l e d by e m o t i o n a l v o l a t i l i t y , a n d she 
25 i s n o t i n t e r e s t e d i n m a k i n g s a c r i f i c e s . 
The preference of the ch i ld , according to the 
testimony of Dr. Stewart, seems to be more or l ess equal . 
That testimony i s persuasive to th i s Court. 
The element of keeping the s ib l ings together , of 
course, i s a serious issue and t h a t , of course, argues in 
favor of continued custody with the p l a i n t i f f . Yet, 
the p l a in t i f f chose from March of 1991 to February of 1992 
to , in large p a r t , rear the chi ldren apart
 t Brandie in day 
care and Paige with her grandmother. 
At th i s stage I am persuaded, according to the 
testimony t h a t ' s been received, the child does not share an 
i n t e r e s t or comfort and care for the other ch i ld , Brandie, 
that i s , at t h i s ear ly stage of development, I am persuaded 
that the long-term bonding issue has not yet ar isen to the 
point where i t would create undue trauma for a t r ans fe r . 
The claim of the p l a in t i f f and her mother that the 
defendant is unreasonable in his r e l ig ious be l i e f s and is 
abnormal because he wants to exercise parenta l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y 
for the physical care of the chi ld i s not borne out by the 
evidence. Moreover, t h i s a t t i t u d e , according to the credible 
and persuasive testimony of Dr. Stewart i s dest ruct ive to 
the c h i l d ' s development. 
The defendant 's views of the p l a i n t i f f are more 
speci f ic and r a t i o n a l . He does not convey his negative 
feel ings toward the p l a i n t i f f to the ch i ld , and p l a i n t i f f and 
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the p l a i n t i f f ' s m o t h e r , a s t h e y have in the p a s t t o Brandie , 
t h e y w i l l , i n a l l l i k e l i h o o d , r e s u l t i n the same s o r t s of 
nega t ive f e e l i n g s b e i n g d e v e l o p e d i n P a i g e . 
The p l a i n t i f f has e v i d e n c e d e m o t i o n a l i n s t a b i l i t y in 
c e r t a i n p a r t i c u l a r s t h a t have been borne o u t by the e v i d e n c e 
For i n s t a n c e , d a t i n g the d e f e n d a n t before she was d i v o r c e d , 
s e e k i n g t o move the m a r r i a g e up in t e rms of t i m e , h a v i n g 
e x p e r i m e n t e d i n the p a s t w i t h i l l i c i t s u b s t a n c e s , t o - w i t , 
c o c a i n e , h a v i n g abused a l c o h o l i n h e r p r i o r m a r r i a g e , 
h a v i n g had an i l l i c i t s e x u a l l i a s o n , h a v i n g abnormal 
r e l i a n c e on h e r m o t h e r , h a v i n g c o n c l u d e d a l m o s t i m m e d i a t e l y 
h e r need t o t e r m i n a t e the m a r r i a g e , and b a r r i n g the 
d e f e n d a n t from the c h i l d ' s b i r t h ; m o r e o v e r , no t c o n s u l t i n g 
the d e f e n d a n t w i t h r e g a r d t o naming of the c h i l d and no t 
e v e n a d v i s i n g him of the c h i l d ' s b i r t h u n t i l f o u r days a f t e r 
i t o c c u r r e d . 
M o r e o v e r , i t i s my v i ew , and I 'm p e r s u a d e d the 
e v i d e n c e s u p p o r t s t h a t v i e w , t h a t she h o l d s the b e l i e f t h a t 
one p a r e n t , the m o t h e r , s h o u l d r a i s e the c h i l d , the f a t h e r 
s h o u l d l eave them a l o n e , and t h i s i s b r o u g h t f o r t h i n 
E x h i b i t 7 , h e r h a n d w r i t t e n l e t t e r . 
S u r r o g a t e ca r e i s , of c o u r s e , r e q u i r e d , no m a t t e r 
wh ich p a r e n t r e c e i v e s c u s t o d y , b u t g i v e n the d e f e n d a n t ' s 
work s c h e d u l e and a n t i c i p a t e d work s c h e d u l e , i t i s more 
f l e x i b l e t h a n the p l a i n t i f f ' s , wh ich would r e s u l t i n l e s s 
1 surrogate care for the child than if the plaintiff had 
2 c u s t o d y . 
3 Tha d e f e n d a n t has e s t a b l i s h e d h i s a b i l i t y t o p r o v i d e 
4
 f o r the d a y - t o - d a y c a r e of Paige d u r i n g h i s c o n s i d e r a b l e 
5 v i s i t a t i o n a r r a n g e m e n t s , and I am p e r s u a d e d t h a t , based 
6
 on h i s t e s t i m o n y as w e l l as t h a t of Dr. S t e w a r t and o t h e r s , 
7
 t h a t he i s p e r f e c t l y c a p a b l e and ab l e t o c a r e f o r t h i s 
8 minor c h i l d . 
9 Changing the c u s t o d i a l a r r a n g e m e n t s can c e r t a i n l y be 
10 t r a u m a t i c , and I am c e r t a i n l y aware of t h a t p r o b l e m . 
11 However, I b e l i e v e t h a t the p e r s u a s i v e e v i d e n c e h e r has 
12 e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t i n P a i g e ' s c a s e , b e i n g now 18 months o l d , 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
she can make the t r a n s i t i o n from one h o u s e h o l d t o the o t h e r 
w i t h o u t the t y p i c a l a t t e n d a n t t r a u m a . She has n o t y e t 
d e v e l o p e d a s ense of b e l o n g i n g o r o w n e r s h i p t o one p a r e n t 
a s opposed t o the o t h e r . I n d e e d , most of h e r l i f e she has 
been c a r e d f o r by s u r r o g a t e s , h e r g r andmothe r and t h e n day 
ca r e and has moved, made the t r a n s i t i o n from the p l a i n t i f f f s 
t o the d e f e n d a n t ' s home w i t h o u t c o n v i n c i n g e v i d e n c e of 
t r a u m a d u r i n g v i s i t a t i o n e x e r c i s e d . 
The d e f e n d a n t has c o m p a t i b l e r e l i g i o u s v a l u e s w i t h 
the c h i l d and a more s t a b l e e x t e n d e d f a m i l y t h a n the 
p l a i n t i f f . 
T h i s Cour t i s p e r s u a d e d t h a t P a i g e ' s b e s t i n t e r e s t s 
would be s e r v e d by the t r a n s f e r of the p r i m a r y c a r e t o the 
10 
1 d e f e n d a n t . He i s the more e m o t i o n a l l y s t a b l e and dependab le 
2 of t h e s e two p a r t i e s . 
3 The p l a i n t i f f ' s l i f e s t y l e , h e r e m o t i o n a l v o l a t i l i t y 
4 and d y s f u n c t i o n a l f a m i l y r e l a t i o n s h i p s p u t P a i g e ' s d e v e l o p -
5 ment i n j e o p a r d y . 
6 T h i s Cour t a d o p t s the r e c omme nda t i ons of Dr. S t e w a r t 
7 as b e i n g r e a s o n a b l e , c r e d i b l e and p e r s u a s i v e and f i n d s , on 
8 the c o r t r a r y , the t e s t i m o n y of D o c t o r s Swaner and McManemin 
9 no t t o be s o p e r s u a s i v e and c r e d i b l e . 
10 P l a i n t i f f i s awarded the v i s i t a t i o n a t a minimum s e t 
11 f o r t h as r ecommenda t ions c o n t a i n e d i n Dr. S t e w a r t ' s r e p o r t , 
12 E x h i b i t 8, e x c e p t i n g t h a t r a t h e r t h a n a h a l f day on e a c h 
13 S a t u r d a y , the p l a i n t i f f s h a l l be awarded one f u l l day e a c h 
14 S a t u r d a y from 9 a .m. t o 6 p .m. In a l l o t h e r p a r t i c u l a r s 
15 a t t h i s t ime the v i s i t a t i o n s c h e d u l e recommended by Dr. 
16 S t e w a r t i s a d o p t e d by t h i s C o u r t . 
17 The p h y s i c a l t r a n s f e r of the c h i l d i s t o t ake p l a c e 
18 Tuesday , t h a t b e i n g tomorrow, a t a t ime t h a t i s c o n v e n i e n t 
19 t o the p a r t i e s . I would a n t i c i p a t e , g iven the work s c h e d u l e 
20 of t h e p a r t i e s a n d I have no k n o w l e d g e a s t o w h a t t h a t 
21 would b e , t h a t sometime i n the morn ing would be the 
22 a p p r o p r i a t e t i m e t o a c t u a l l y t r a n s f e r t h e p h y s i c a l c u s t o d y 
23 of t h e c h i l d , a n d I w i l l s e t a t i m e of t e n o ' c l o c k a . m . , 
24 u n l e s s t h e p a r t i e s a r e a b l e t o a g r e e o t h e r w i s e . 
25 The d e f e n d a n t i s a w a r d e d c h i l d s u p p o r t p u r s u a n t t o t h e 
11 
Uniform C h i l d Suppor t G u i d e l i n e s , b a s e d upon the income of 
the p a r t i e s r e f l e c t e d i n E x h i b i t 6. 
Each p a r t y i s t o b e a r t h e i r own a t t o r n e y ' s f e e s . 
Mr. Ludlow, you p r e p a r e the F i n d i n g s of F a c t , 
C o n c l u s i o n s of Law and Decree-, submi t t h o s e t o Ms. C h r i s t i a n 
f o r a p p r o v a l a s t o form. 
MR. LUDLOW: I w i l l do s o , s i r . 
THE COURT: Are t h e r e any q u e s t i o n s , c o u n s e l ? 
MR. LUDLOW: No, you r Honor. 
THE COURT: Very w e l l . Cour t w i l l be i n r e c e s s . 
(Whereupon, the p r o c e e d i n g s were c o n c l u d e d . ) 
* * * 
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STATE 
COUNTY 
2 2 0 , a 
U t a h ; 
w i t h i n 
REPORTER'S 
OF UTAH ) 
) s s 
OF SALT LAKE ) 
I , ANNA M. 
T h a t I 
BENNETT, d o 
am a C e r t i f i e d 
ind one of t h e o f f i c i a l 
t h a t on 
m a t t e r 
t h e r e a t ; t h a t 
t o be 
t h e 
and 
l a t e 
t r a n s c r i b e d 
1 s t d a y of 
r e p o r t e d i n 
r I c a u s e d 
CERTIFICATE 
h e r e b y c e r t i f y : 
S h o r t h a n d R e p o r t e r , L i c e n s e No. 
c o u r t r e p o r t e r s of t h e s t a t e of 
J u n e , 1 9 9 2 , I a t t e n d e d t h e 
s h o r t h a n d t h e p r o c e e d i n g s h a d 
my s a i d s h o r t h a n d p r o c e e d i n g s 
i n t o t y p e w r i t i n g , a n d t h e f o r e g o i n g 
p a g e s , n u m b e r e d f rom 2 t o 1 2 , i n c l u s i v e , c o n s t i t u t e a f u l l , 
[ true and c o r r e c t a c c o u n t of t h e J u d g e ' s R u l i n g , t o t h e b e s t 
of my a b i l i t y . 
DATED a t S a l t Lake C i t y , U t a h , t h i s 2nd d a y of J u n e , 
1 9 9 2 . 
ANNA M. BENNETT, CSR 
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APPENDIX B RLIODISTSiST COURT 
Third Judicial District 
'~^ £U*^ / RANDY S. LUDLOW #2011 <—^ , Attorney for^f>i*ii*^^ip^r 
311 South State Street, Suite 280 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone (801) 531-1300 
JUL 8 1992 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TORI K. EVANS 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ROBERT L. EVANS 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW 
Case No. 904904449 DA 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
The above-entitled matter having come on for trial commencing 
on the 28th day of May, :i 992 ai i< i concludi i ig c i i June 1 , ] 992: which 
trial was held before the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick; the 
plaintiff being present and represented by her attorney of record, 
Helen E. Christian; the defendant being present and represented by 
his attorney of record, Randy S. Ludlow; the Court having taken 
evidence from witnesses together with the presentation of exhibits 
and based upon such and good cause appearing herein the Court makes 
these its 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Each of the parties are residences of Salt Lake County, 
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State of Utah and have been for more than three months immediately 
prior to the commencement of this action. 
2. The parties each filed separate divorce actions with the 
plaintiff filing in case number D90-4449 which was filed on 
November 5, 1990 and the defendant having filed in case number D91-
25 filed on January 30, 1991 which actions were consolidated by 
order of the court on February 8, 1991 with the Complaint of the 
defendant in the latter action treated as an answer and 
counterclaim. 
3. The parties were married on March 9, 1990 in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah. 
4. The parties have had born as issue to them one child, to 
wit: Paige Evans, born December 18, 1990. 
5. Irreconcilable differences have arisen between the 
parties making continuation of the marriage impossible. 
6. The parties have acquired no real property jointly during 
the course of the marriage and it is appropriate that each of the 
parties be awarded their respective homes and real property free 
and clear of any claim by the other. 
7. It is appropriate that each of the parties be awarded 
those items of personal property that they presently hold in their 
possession free and clear of any claim by the other. 
8. The parties have each acquired debts and obligations 
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which have been maintained in their own separate names and each of 
the parties should responsible for those debts and obligations 
which they have obtained without contribution from the other. 
9 Each of the parties are gainfully employed and neither 
party shoii] d be awarded a] I mon^ from the other. 
10 • The plaintiff is employed earning the sum of One Thousand 
Four Hundred Fifty-Six Dollars ($1,456) per month and the defendant 
is employed earning the sum of Two Thousand Three Hundr ed Ninety-
Three Dollars ($2,393) per month which amounts are to be used for 
the calculation of child support. The defendant has available to 
him through his employment medical and dental insurance on behalf 
of the parties minor child at a reasonable cost of Forty Dollars 
($4 0) per irioi ith and i t i s appropriate tl la t: til le defendant continue 
to provide the same so long as such insurance is available to him 
at reasonable cost. If the plaintiff obtains insurance through her 
employment at reasonable cost, the plaintiff should be required to 
maintain the same. The parties should additionally share equally 
all c o s t s f o i: a ] ] med i c a 1 , de n t a .1 , o r t h o d o n t i c, op t i c a 1 a i i d 
prescription costs which are not covered by insurance. 
11. The parties stipulated to a custody evaluation with the 
partles joint] y agreein e appoii ltment ol Dr EIizabeth 
Stewart as the evaluator The defendant has paid to Dr. Stewart 
Three Thousand Dollars ($"f,00n) for the costs of the eval nation and 
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it is appropriate that each of the parties pay one-half (%) of the 
fees incurred for the evaluation. 
12. The plaintiff has claimed she incurred certain day care 
expenses owing pursuant to Exhibit C which expenses were paid to 
the plaintiff's mother. Evidence as presented to the Court was 
conflicting as to whether or not those sums of One Thousand One 
Hundred Dollars ($1,100) were in actuality paid for the parties 
child's care. The plaintiff has failed to provide sufficient 
evidence to the Court that the claimed One Thousand One Hundred 
Dollars have actually been incurred on behalf of the parties minor 
child for day care expenses. 
13. Dr. Elizabeth Stewart had conducted interviews with the 
defendant, with the defendant's mother, with the plaintiff on five 
different occasions, with the plaintiff's mother and father, the 
pediatrician of the child, Dr. Thomas, the day care provider, and 
plaintiff's stepmother. Dr. Stewart had further observed the minor 
child in the presence of both parents and observed the child with 
her stepsister Brandie. Dr. Stewart performed diagnostic 
evaluation tests including the MMPI, the Rotter sentence completion 
test# custody questionnaire, all of which activities were performed 
over a two to three month period from October of 1991 to December 
of 1991. 
14. The persons who challenge Dr. Stewart's report, Dr. 
00000019.L92 
Johanna McManemim and Dr. Paula Swaner made no third-party 
contacts, observed no parental interaction with the child and 
completed r»o custody evaluations. 
The Court has reviewed the factors pursuant to Rule 4-903, 
Code of Judicid .1 Administration and pursuant to Utah '"'ode Ann. 
30-3-10 and finds as follows: 
A- The parental bond between the child and the two parents 
is equally strong. Both parties have a positive sense of 
responsibility to the child's nurturing and protection. The child 
has now bee n p 1 a c e d i n d a y e a r e r a t h e r t h a n i n t h e c a r e o f t h e 
plaintiff's mother, which arrangement the Court views as 
problematic. 
B The plaintiff'"s atti ti ide towar d the defendant, wh icl :i i s 
unduly influenced by her mother, is negative and exclusionary. 
Plaintiff's unreasonab] e restrictions on visitation is one example 
of plaintiff's antagonism towards the relationship o^ the minor 
child to her father. 
C. The emotional stabi 3 i t:y ai id tl le cl laracter of the 
defendant is superior to that of the plaintiff even though both 
parents are resourceful, economically, and psychologically 
independent. The defendant has a better, more realistic 
appreciation of the value * family life and i s more likely to 
produce a stab 1 <•* home <i, 11 • v i ronment w it \i positi v e soela 1 and 
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emotional development on behalf of the child. The defendant sets 
long range goals, is rational in his approach to problems and not 
vulnerable to change in standards. The defendant is less impulsive 
and more sensitive to the concerns of other people. 
Plaintiff has evidenced emotional volatility and an 
insensitivity to others. Plaintiff is primarily concerned with her 
own economic comfort. Plaintiffs judgment is flawed by 
conflicting values. Plaintiff seriously distrusts men. 
Plaintiff's problem solving is imperiled by emotional volatility 
and she is not interested in making sacrifices. 
D. The preference of the child is more or less equal. 
E. Though it is important to keep siblings together, the 
plaintiff chose for March of 1991 to February of 1992 to rear the 
children apart having Brandie in day care and Paige with her 
grandmother. The child, Paige, does not share an interest or 
comfort and care for the other child, Brandie at this early stage 
of development. Long term bonding has not yet risen to the point 
where it would create undue trauma for a transfer. 
F. The claim of the plaintiff and her mother that the 
defendant is unreasonable in his religious beliefs and is abnormal 
because he wants to exercise parental responsibility for the 
physical care of the child is not borne out by the evidence and 
testimony presented to the Court. Such an attitude is, in fact, 
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destructive to the child's development. 
G. The defendant's views of the plaintiff are rational. The 
defendant rL -.: 1: coi i v ey hi s i legati ve feelings toward the 
plaintiff t •. child while the plaintiff and her mother have 
shown that type of negative attitude toward the defendant Thi s 
would most likely result j n tl le same negative feelings being 
developed in the parties minor child Paige as have been developed 
in plaintiff's chi 1 ci Brandie. • " 
H Plaintiff has evidenced emotional instability in certain 
particulars which include: dating before the plaintiff became 
divorced; seeking to move the marriage up In time; having 
experimented in the past with illicit substances, to wit, cocaine; 
having abu s ed a ] coho 1 i i i 1 Iei: pr i or mar r i age; havi ng had a i i 1 1 1 i c it 
sexual liaison; having abnormal reliance upon her mother; having 
concluded almost immediately her need to terminate this marriage; 
barring the defendant from the child's birth and not consulting the 
defendant with regards to naming the child and not even advising 
the defendant of the chi ] d's b:i r th iinti ] f :>i n (4) days after :i 1: 
occurred. The plaintiff holds the belief that one parent, the 
mother, should raise the child alone with the father excluded. 
I. Both parents will be required to pro /ide day care because 
of their work schedules. Defendant's work schedule is more 
flexible and the anticipated work schedule woul d resul t In ] ess 
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surrogate care for the child with the defendant than if the 
plaintiff had custody. 
J. Defendant has established his ability to provide for the 
day to day care of the child and the defendant is perfectly able 
and capable of caring for the minor child. 
K. The child may be transferred from the one household to 
the household of the defendant without trauma. The child has yet 
to develop a sense of belonging or ownership to one parent and for 
most of her life she has been cared for by surrogates including her 
grandmother and now day care. 
L. Defendant has compatible religious values with the child 
and a more stable extended family than the plaintiff. 
M. Defendant is more dependable than the plaintiff. 
N. Plaintiff's lifestyle, her emotional volatility and 
dysfunctional family relationships put the minor child's 
development in jeopardy. 
15. It is in the best interest of Paige Evans that the 
defendant be awarded the care, custody, and control of the parties 
minor child. The plaintiff to be awarded visitation at a minimum 
as set forth in the recommendations as contained in the report of 
Dr. Stewart with the exception that rather than a half day on each 
Saturday, the plaintiff should be awarded one full day each 
Saturday from 9:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. 
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16. The physical transfer of the parties minor child is to 
occur on Tuesday, June 2, 1992. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact the Court makes these its 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. E a c h o f 11 i e p a r 11 e s a r e a w a i: d e d a d e c r e e o f d i v o r c e 
dissolving the bonds of matrimony which decree shall become final 
upon entry. 
2. Each party is awarded those items of personal and real 
property which they presently hold in their possession or is titled 
:! n that party1' s name free ai id c] ear of any cl a I m by the other, 
3. Each party is awarded their own retirements and pension 
plans. 
4. Neither party i s awarded alimony, 
5. The defendant is awarded judgment against the plaintiff 
for the Thousand Five Hundred Do! lars ($1,500) 
representing one-half (%) custody evaluation costs which costs have 
previously been paid by the defendant to Dr. Elizabeth Stewart. 
T h e p ] a i n t i f f' s c 1 a i m f o i d a y c: a r e a i: r e a i: a g e i s d e i l i e d, 
the plaintiff having failed her burden of proof that the expenses 
were, in fact, incurred on behalf of the parties minor child. 
The defendant is awarded the care, custody, and control 
of the parties minor child, Paige Evans, subject ~ the plaintiff's 
rights., of vi s i t a t i o n which at, a minimum shal .  = -. a. f o l l o w s : 
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Mrs. Evans should have visitation every Saturday from 9:00 
a.m. until 6:00 p.m. and every Wednesday from 6:00 p.m. until 8:00 
p.m. 
Paige will spend Martin Luther King Day in January with her 
mother and will spend President's Day in February with her father. 
Paige will spend Memorial Day with her father. 
Paige will spend July 4th with her mother when it does not 
fall on a Sunday, Monday or Tuesday. She will spend July 4th with 
her father when it does fall on a Sunday, Monday or Tuesday. 
Paige will spend July 24th with her mother when it does not 
fall on a Sunday, Monday or Tuesday and she will spend July 24th 
with her father when it does fall on a Sunday, Monday or Tuesday. 
Paige will spend Labor Day with her father. 
Paige will spend Thanksgiving Day on odd-numbered years with 
her mother from 1:00 p.m. until 6:00 p.m. and shall spend even-
numbered years with her Father. 
Paige will have a visit with her mother on Christmas Eve Day 
from 5:00 p.m. until 8:00 p.m. On Christmas Day she will have a 
visit with her mother from noon until 4:00 p.m. When Paige is of 
school age she will have an additional visit with her mother three 
school days during the school holiday if her mother is off work and 
is at home with her on those days. 
Paige will have a one week visit with her mother when she is 
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age four In the summer if her mother is off work. When she is five 
years o] d she * ^ i i spend two weeks wi th he r mother. 
Paige wil - woi: her mother on Mother's Day from noon until 
6:00 p.m. if she is not otherwise with her. 
Paige will spend I.roiii 6.v0 ji.in, uiiti I 8:00 f-.iii with her 
mother on her mother's birthday. Paige will also have a visit with 
her mother and half sister, Brandie, on Brandie's birthday or at 
such time as it is celebrated. 
8. The defendant is awarded support from the plaintiff in 
the sum o £ Oi ie Hundr ed F i f ty • Thz ee I)o 11 ar s ($ 1 5 3 ) per month 
commencing with the month of June, 1992, which support is 
consistent with the Utah Uniform Child Support Guidelines. Each 
party shall be responsible for one-half (%) of the defendant's work 
related child care expenses. 
9 - The de f endant i s to ma i nta In on beha 1 f of the par 11es 
minor child the medical and dental insurance as is presently 
available to him through his employment so long as such is 
available at: r easonabl e cost: If medical ai id dental insurance 
becomes available to the plaintiff at reasonable cost, she is to 
provide the same. Each of the parties are responsibl e to pa> one 
half (%) of al1 non-covered medical, dental, orthodontic, optical, 
psychotherapy, and prescription costs which are incurred on behalf 
of the mi nor ch i ] d. 
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10. Each party is to bear and be responsible for their own 
attorneys fees and costs incurred by them in this action. 
DATED this Of July, 1992. 
tiou^r: A i I 
Judge /J . Deririi^ F r e d e r i c k 
A^PPROVED AS T& FORM:_^ /^] / 
Helen Christian 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
00000019.L92 000180 
APPENDIX c FILES QISTftiST COURT 
Third Judicial District 
JUL 8 1992 
RANDY S. LUDLOW #2011 \ 
Attorney for Defendant \ 
311 South State Street, Suite 2 80 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone (801) 531-1300 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNT STATE OK UTAH 
TORI K. EVANS ] 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. 
ROBERT L. EVANS j 
Defendant. ] 
) DECREE OF DIVORCE 
> Case No. 904904449 DA 
) Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
The above-entitled matter having come on for trial commencing 
on the 281[i da;) of May, 1992 and concluding on June 1, 1992 which 
trial was held before the Honorable 3 Dennis Frederick; the 
plaintiff being present and represented by her attorney of record, 
Helen E, Christian; the defendant being present and represented by 
his attorney of record, Randy S. Ludlow; the Court having taken 
evidence fr om witnesses together wi tl i. the presentation of exhibits 
and the Court previously having entered its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law now, based upon such , ,se appearing 
herein, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS: 
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1. Each of the parties are awarded a decree of divorce 
dissolving the bonds of matrimony which decree shall become final 
upon entry. 
2. Each party is awarded those items of personal and real 
property which they presently hold in their possession or is titled 
in that party's name free and clear of any claim by the other. 
3. Each party is awarded their own retirements and pension 
plans. 
4. Neither party is awarded alimony. 
5. The defendant is awarded judgment against the plaintiff 
for the sum of One Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($1,500) 
representing one-half (%) custody evaluation costs which costs have 
previously been paid by the defendant to Dr. Elizabeth Stewart. 
6. The plaintiff's claim for day care arrearage is denied, 
the plaintiff having failed her burden of proof that the expenses 
were, in fact, incurred on behalf of the parties minor child. 
7. The defendant is awarded the care, custody, and control 
of the parties minor child, Paige Evans, subject to the plaintiff's 
rights of visitation which at a minmum shall be as follows: 
Mrs. Evans should have visitation every Saturday from 9:00 
a.m. until 6:00 p.m. and every Wednesday from 6:00 p.m. until 8:00 
p.m. 
Paige will spend Martin Luther King Day in January with her 
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mother and will spend President's Day in February wi 1 .h her father. 
Paige wi1] spend Memorial Day with her father. 
Paige will spend July 4th with her mother when it does not 
fall on a Sunday. Monday or Tuesday, She- wi 1 I spend July 4tl I wi th 
her father when It does fall on a Sunday, Monday or Tuesday. 
Paige will spend July 24th with her mother when it does not 
fall c , Monday or Tuesday and she will spend July 24th 
with her father when it does fall on a Sunday, Monday or Tuesday. 
Paige will spend Labor Day wi th hex father. 
Paige will spend Thanksgiving Day on odd-numbered years with 
her mother from 1:00 p.m. until 6:00 p.m. and shall spend even-
numbered years with ln't Father. 
Paige will have a visit with her mother on Christmas Eve Day 
from 5:00 p.m. until 8:00 p.m. ^hristmas *;-5 - a 
visit with her mother from noon until 4:00 p.m. When Paige is of 
school age she will have an additional visit with her mother three 
school days durinq the; schawl tioliday if IIPI mother is off work and 
is at home with her on those days. 
Paige will have a one week visit with her mother when she Is 
age four in tht1 summer if her mother is off work. When she is five 
years old she can spend two weeks with her mother. 
Paige will visit hei mother1 on Mother's Day from noon until 
6:00 p.m. if she is not otherwise with her. 
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Paige will spend from 6:00 p.m. until 8:00 p.m. with her 
mother on her mother's birthday. Paige will also have a visit with 
her mother and half sister, Brandie, on Brandie's birthday or at 
such time as it is celebrated. 
8. The defendant is awarded support from the plaintiff in 
the sum of One Hundred Fifty-Three Dollars ($153) per month 
commencing with the month of June, 1992, which support is 
consistent with the Utah Uniform Child Support Guidelines. Each 
party shall be responsible for one-half (%) of the defendant's work 
related child care expenses. 
9. The defendant is to maintain on behalf of the parties 
minor child the medical and dental insurance as is presently 
available to him through his employment so long as such is 
available at reasonable cost. If medical and dental insurance 
becomes available to the plaintiff at reasonable cost, she is to 
provide the same. Each of the parties are responsible to pay one-
half (%) of all non-covered medical, dental, orthodontic, optical, 
psychotherapy, and prescription costs which are incurred on behalf 
of the minor child. 
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10, Each party is to bear and be responsible for their own 
attorneys fees and costs incurred by them in this action. 
DATED this K^day of July, ,^/2, 
BY THE/1 COURT: 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
-MAILING C cIC CERTIFICATE . . r f\ 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed- a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, and 
DECREE OF DIVORCE, by placing the same in the United States Mail, 
in a postage pre-pai d seal ed envelope, thi s _ N3 day of .Jul y, 1992 
to the following: 
Helen Christian 
Suite 722, Boston Building 
9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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